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This paper addresses the problem of exchanging uncertainty assessments in multi-agent sys-
tems. Since it is assumed that each agent might completely ignore the internal representation
of its partners, a common interchange format is needed. We analyze the case of an interchange
format deﬁned by means of imprecise probabilities, pointing out the reasons of this choice. A
core problem with the interchange format concerns transformations from imprecise probabi-
lities into other formalisms (in particular, precise probabilities, possibilities, belief functions).
We discuss this so far little investigated question, analyzing how previous proposals, mostly
regarding special instances of imprecise probabilities, would ﬁt into this problem. We then
propose some general transformation procedures, which take also account of the fact that
information can be partial, i.e. may concern an arbitrary (ﬁnite) set of events.
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The deﬁnition of an interchange format for information exchange is a key is-
sue in order to enable interoperability among independently developed and
heterogeneous software systems, possibly adopting diﬀerent internal representa-
tions. In particular, interoperability is a fundamental requirement in the
development of multi-agent systems [30], namely systems composed by a set of
autonomous, but interacting software entities (called agents). A typical applica-
tion scenario is a virtual marketplace, where independently owned software
agents automate some of the activities related to the buying and selling of goods
[26].
The most inﬂuential proposal in this area is the knowledge interchange format
(KIF) [24], which is a language designed for use in the interchange of knowledge
among disparate computer systems. Actually, KIF is a preﬁx version of the language
of ﬁrst order predicate calculus with various extensions to enhance its expressiveness.
As to our knowledge, KIF does not address the case where the pieces of information
to be exchanged are fuzzy and/or aﬀected by uncertainty. Similarly, a recently pro-
posed tool to support interoperability among software agents [10] focuses on mes-
sage translation into a common XML format, without considering the possible
presence of uncertainty. This clearly restricts the applicability of this and similar
proposals to the contexts where the importance of fuzziness and uncertainty is
negligible.
To ﬁll this gap, we address the problem of deﬁning an interchange format for the
exchange of uncertain information among heterogeneous agents, each one featuring
a speciﬁc uncertainty representation.
Next to identifying a candidate interchange format, it is necessary to deﬁne
transformation procedures between the common format and the agents
speciﬁc ones, in order to allow message exchanges. This issue turns out to be
rather problematic, as generally valid transformation criteria cannot be identi-
ﬁed, since, in particular, some reasonable requirements are indeed conﬂicting
and, as a consequence, some arbitrariness is inherent to any transformation
procedure.
The present work aims therefore at analyzing the main issues involved in the def-
inition of an uncertainty interchange format and of the relevant uncertainty transfor-
mations, presenting a proposal based on imprecise probabilities and pointing out the
relevant open problems.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the problem of uncer-
tainty interchange and the assumptions which are made to better specify it. Sec-
tion 3 recalls some basic concepts and motivates the choice of coherent
imprecise probabilities as an uncertainty interchange format, while in Section 4
the basic issues related to the deﬁnition of transformation procedures are dis-
cussed. Sections 5–7 discuss the problem of transforming imprecise probabilities
into precise probabilities, possibilities, and belief functions, respectively. An exam-
ple of application of these procedures is provided in Section 8, while Section 9
concludes the paper.
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We make the basic assumption that an agent might completely ignore the internal
representation adopted by its partners and should not need to negotiate preliminarily
any aspect of the interchange. Therefore no direct transformation between the rep-
resentations internally adopted by diﬀerent agents is possible and an intermediate
interchange format is needed. While this assumption prevents the potential advanta-
ges of a tailored communication, it is coherent with the goal of maximum generality:
for instance, it allows indirect communication through shared data bases, where the
agent inserting new information does not know a priori who will eventually access it.
Moreover, suppose the information exchange concerns n diﬀerent uncertainty repre-
sentations. Then direct transformations may require deﬁning up to n2–n transforma-
tion procedures, while at most 2n transformation procedures are needed if an
interchange format is introduced.
Consider now the process of exchanging a piece of uncertain information between
a sender, called agent S, and a receiver, called agent R. We assume that each agent X
uses a speciﬁc internal representation language LX, whereas the common interchange
format language is denoted by LIF. Agent S produces the information to be ex-
changed and transforms it from LS into LIF. The transformation result is then trans-
mitted to agent R, which is in charge of transforming it from LIF into LR. Since LIF
should be, in general, more expressive than any speciﬁc language LX, any transfor-
mation of the kind LX ! LIF should involve a null (or minimal) distortion or loss of
information. On the other hand, any transformation LIF! LX may involve some
possibly signiﬁcant information loss or distortion, since it goes from a general format
to a more speciﬁc one.
To better specify the interchange problem, the following assumptions are made:
(1) the information exchange concerns uncertainty judgements1 about (binary)
non-conditional events;
(2) all agents share a common ﬁnite universe of discourse (or partition) X, and the
events about which they formulate their uncertainty judgements constitute an
arbitrary subset S of 2X, the powerset of X.
Both assumptions are partially limiting and not completely realistic, but are useful
to face gradually the problem; it is also important to note that, as will be stressed
later, they are not forced by the interchange format we adopt.
A judgement qualifying the belief attitude of the agent with respect to the truth of
an event (the judgement about its falsity can be referred to the truth of its negation)
may be either absolute (when expressed through some quantiﬁcation) or relational
(also called comparative or qualitative, when deﬁning a relation comparing the belief
attitudes of two or more events). These two kinds of judgements cannot be easily1 This notion will be better speciﬁed in the sequel.
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paper, we focus here on absolute judgements.
In particular, we consider both precise and imprecise judgements. Imprecise
judgements, i.e. judgements which associate a set of quantiﬁcations with an event,
may be either crisp or fuzzy, depending on whether the sets of quantiﬁcations are,
respectively, classical or fuzzy sets.
Clearly, fuzzy imprecise quantiﬁcations are more general and therefore appear to
be a good basis for the deﬁnition of the interchange format. However, two diﬃculties
have to be acknowledged:
• since a fuzzy set can in general be deﬁned by any membership function, the for-
malism may turn out to be very complex, unless the class of admissible member-
ship functions is constrained in some way;
• some of the most known uncertainty theories (imprecise probabilities, belief func-
tions, possibility theory) can be characterized in terms of crisp imprecise quanti-
ﬁcations, namely intervals.
For these reasons, while recognizing the potential importance of fuzzy sets for fu-
ture developments, we limit the scope of the present paper to quantiﬁcations through
crisp intervals, namely through a couple of numbers (a,b) : a 6 b; a, b 2 [0,1].
After deciding the format for a single uncertainty judgement, a standard format
for an exchange of uncertain information should be deﬁned. We assume that the
agents adopt one of the existing standards for inter-agent communication, such as
KQML [22] or FIPA ACL [23]: the choice of the communication language is rather
indiﬀerent, since our work focuses on the representation of the information carried
by the message rather than on the structure of the message itself. Clearly these two
aspects are independent.
As for the amount of information to be exchanged, S may be any set of events an
agent considers interesting. This has, in particular, obvious advantages concerning
the volume of information exchanged and the computational burden involved by
the transformation. Moreover no non-requested information needs to be introduced
in the exchange.
A message contents carrying uncertain information is therefore constituted by the
speciﬁcation of one or more events, which can be provided using KIF, and by the
speciﬁcation of the relevant uncertainty judgements, according to the interchange
format that will be deﬁned in the following.3. Selecting an interchange format
3.1. Preliminaries
We use the symbol X to denote both the certain event and a ﬁnite set—also called
universal set or partition—of pairwise disjoint (non-impossible) elementary events
whose union is the certain event: X ¼ fx1; . . . ;xNg.
P. Baroni, P. Vicig / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 40 (2005) 147–180 151Then x1; . . . ;xN are called atoms, 2
X is the powerset of X, jAj is the cardinality of
A 2 2X, i.e. the number of distinct atoms of X whose union is A.
An uncertainty assessment (or assignment) is, in general, a function from an arbi-
trary set of events to the set of admissible uncertainty judgements. To recall the basic
concepts underlying several well-known uncertainty theories it is however useful to
initially consider the case where the set of events coincides with 2X and the uncer-
tainty assessment is a function f : 2X ! [0, 1].
An uncertainty assessment should at least satisfy a minimal monotonicity require-
ment and two obvious conditions: this gives rise to the notion of capacity.
A mapping C : 2X ! [0,1] is a (normalized) capacity [9] whenever:
Cð;Þ ¼ 0; CðXÞ ¼ 1; CðAÞ 6 CðBÞ; 8A;B 2 2X such that A  B:
A capacity is 2-monotone iﬀ 8A;B 2 2X; CðA [ BÞ P CðAÞ þ CðBÞ  CðA \ BÞ.
Belief functions [41], and in particular necessity measures [19] and, when deﬁned
on 2X, ﬁnitely additive probabilities, are special cases of 2-monotone capacities.
Their deﬁnitions are well known; we shall recall in Proposition 1 their characteriza-
tions in terms of their Mo¨bius inverses [9].
For any f : 2X ! R, there is a one-to-one correspondence between f and its
Mo¨bius inverse or mass function m : 2X ! R, given 8A 2 2X by [9,40]:
mðAÞ ¼
X
BA
ð1ÞjAnBjf ðBÞ; f ðAÞ ¼
X
BA
mðBÞ ð1Þ
The events A 2 2X such that m(A)5 0 are called focal elements.
Proposition 1. Given f : 2X ! R, let m be its Mo¨bius inverse. Then
(a) f is a capacity iff m is such that: mð;Þ ¼ 0; PB22XmðBÞ ¼ 1; 8A 2 2X; 8x 2 A;P
x2BAmðBÞ P 0.
Further, if f is a capacity and F the set of its focal elements, then
(b) f is a 2-monotone capacity iff 8A;B 2 2X; PCA[B;C 6A;C 6BmðCÞ P 0;
(c) f is a belief function iff m is non-negative;
(d) f is a necessity measure iff F is totally ordered by relation ;
(e) f is a (precise) probability iff ðA 2 F Þ ) ðA atom of XÞ.Note that if f is a capacity, f ðxÞ ¼ mðxÞ P 0; 8x 2 X.
The conjugate C 0 of a capacity C is deﬁned by the conjugacy relation
C0ðAÞ ¼ 1 CðAcÞ; 8A 2 2X. The conjugate of a 2-monotone capacity, a belief
function (Bel), a necessity measure (N) is termed, respectively, 2-alternating capa-
city, plausibility function (Pl), possibility (P). A precise probability (P) is self-
conjugate.
Capacities may be too loose as uncertainty measures, as stronger consistency
requirements are often needed. Coherent lower (and upper) imprecise probabilities
are a natural candidate, since they are more general than the measures, other than
capacities, recalled so far and their deﬁnition is based on well-founded rationality
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referring to an arbitrary (ﬁnite or not, structured or not) set of events S. We assume
here that S  2X. Coherent lower probabilities are indirectly characterized as lower
envelopes of precise probabilities on S. Denoting withM the set of all precise prob-
abilities dominating P on S (i.e. P 2M iﬀ PðAÞ P P ðAÞ; 8A 2 S), the following lower
envelope theorem holds [47].
Proposition 2. P is a coherent lower probability on S iff there exists a (non-empty) set
D M such that P ðAÞ ¼ inf P2DPðAÞ; 8A 2 S (inf is attained).
One may refer to either lower (P ) or upper (P ) probabilities only, exploiting the
conjugacy relation:
P ðAÞ ¼ 1 P ðAcÞ ð2Þ
In particular, assessing both P ðAÞ and P ðAÞ is equivalent to assessing P ðAÞ and
P ðAcÞ ¼ 1 P ðAÞ.
When P ðAÞ ¼ P ðAÞ ¼ P ðAÞ; 8A 2 S, P is a precise probability (coherent by de
Finettis deﬁnition [15]) on S (a ﬁnitely additive probability if S ¼ 2X).
Later, we shall use the following necessary condition for coherence:
P ðA [ BÞ P P ðAÞ þ P ðBÞ; 8A;B : A \ B ¼ ; ðA;B;A [ B 2 SÞ ð3Þ
When S ¼ 2X, lower (upper) probabilities are capacities, and include 2-monotone (2-
alternating) capacities as special cases.
Coherent imprecise probabilities can therefore be regarded as a very general tool,
which generalizes various uncertainty measures. In particular, a belief function [41] is
a special case of lower probability [48], and so is a necessity measure which can be
seen as a special case of belief function (actually, as a consonant belief function)
[19,42], while plausibility and possibility measures are special upper probabilities
[48].
Imprecise probabilities appear to be a suitable candidate for the deﬁnition of an
uncertainty interchange format, for the following reasons.
Firstly, no transformation is needed from the agent internal representation LX to
the common interchange format whenever LX is based on an uncertainty measure
which is a special case of imprecise probability, like the (quite common) ones we con-
sider in this paper. In fact, in such instances, information produced by the agent may
be simply read as an imprecise probability in the interchange format, without mod-
ifying any of its numerical values.
Moreover, some of the assumptions we made might be widely relaxed while keep-
ing on using an interchange format based on imprecise probabilities. In fact, coher-
ent lower (and upper) probabilities are deﬁned also on inﬁnite sets of events. Further,
by the extension theorem [47], an imprecise probability on any set of events S can
always be coherently extended to any superset of S, and this allows exchanging infor-2 We shall often omit the term coherent in the sequel.
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tures are shared also by generalizations of imprecise probabilities to conditional
imprecise probabilities and previsions (the latter are suited for handling information
on conditional random variables) [47].
Of course, there are important ways of expressing uncertainty which are not spe-
cial cases of imprecise probabilities and therefore would need some transformation
before using the proposed interchange format: we mention fuzzy judgements, which
should be reduced to crisp intervals, and comparative probabilities, for which a real-
ization problem (by means of an imprecise probability) arises, and it is not guaran-
teed a priori that it always has a solution. These issues are beyond the scope of the
present paper.
Another question, which can be partly encompassed within the theory of coher-
ent imprecise probabilities, concerns uncertainty assessments which are themselves
imprecisely determined. For instance, interval-valued belief structures were intro-
duced in [17] to extend the theory of belief functions to the case of beliefs expressed
with some imprecision. Suppose that a lower uncertainty assessment on S is impre-
cisely speciﬁed, meaning that there is a set F L of assessments f which are all admis-
sible. This type of uncertainty may be described computing f ðlÞL ðAÞ ¼ inf f2F Lf ðAÞ
and f ðuÞL ðAÞ ¼ supf2F Lf ðAÞ; 8A 2 S. It is known that whenever the measures f are
coherent lower probabilities, so is their lower envelope f ðlÞL (cf. [47, Theorem 2.6.3
(b)]); in particular f ðlÞL is a coherent lower probability when all f 2 FL are (possibly
partial, as will be the case later on) belief functions or necessities. On the contrary,
function f ðuÞL is generally not a coherent imprecise probability: hence imprecise pro-
babilities can describe this kind of imprecision partly, but generally not fully (the
description is complete when all measures f are precise probabilities). Specular re-
sults obviously apply to the lower and upper bounds on any set of upper uncertainty
measures.4. Deﬁning uncertainty transformations
4.1. Transformation criteria
The problem of transforming an uncertainty assessment UORIG expressed in the
context of a given formalism LORIG into another assessment UDEST within a diﬀerent
formalism LDEST has no straightforward solution. In fact:
• if LDEST is intrinsically more precise than LORIG (for instance, LDEST is a precise
probability while LORIG is an imprecise one), the precision imposed by LDEST has
to be achieved by introducing some constraint, not entailed by the original
representation;
• if LDEST is intrinsically less precise than LORIG (as in the case, to be discussed
later, where LDEST is a possibility while LORIG is an imprecise probability), the
precision inherent to the original representation needs to be sacriﬁced in some
way.
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mechanism turns out to be questionable in some respect (see, for instance, the discus-
sion in [21] about precise probability/possibility transformations). As a consequence,
several diﬀerent transformation criteria have been considered in the literature. They
can be roughly partitioned into two main classes: acceptability criteria deﬁne neces-
sary conditions to be satisﬁed by acceptable transformation results, while selection
criteria can be used to select a transformation result among the acceptable ones.
Examples of acceptability criteria are the consistency criterion, the preference
preservation principle, the uncertainty invariance principle.
The consistency criterion requires that UDEST respects some consistency con-
straints, referring to UORIG. For instance in [21] consistency between a precise prob-
ability P and a possibility P is represented by the following dominance condition:
P ðAÞ 6 PðAÞ; 8A 2 2X. An analogous condition is adopted in [29] to deﬁne consis-
tency between a precise probability and a capacity and in [20] in the context of
approximations of belief functions.
More generally, when considering two uncertainty formalisms L1 and L2 it may
appear that L1 is intrinsically more precise than (or at least as precise as) L2 (e.g.
a precise probability is clearly more precise than a possibility). In this case, a trans-
formation from L1 into L2 should give a more imprecise evaluation (vice versa when
passing from L2 to L1). This leads operationally to a dominance condition which can
be expressed in terms of upper measures:
L1ðAÞ 6 L2ðAÞ; 8A 2 2X ð4Þ
or equivalently in terms of their conjugate lower measures:
L1ðAÞ P L2ðAÞ; 8A 2 2X ð5Þ
Preference preservation requires that some credibility order induced on events
by UORIG is preserved by UDEST. An example is the strict preference preservation
principle, considered in [21]: UORIGðAÞ > UORIGðBÞ () UDESTðAÞ > UDESTðBÞ;
8A;B 2 2X.
In general, however, associating a (partial) credibility ordering with an uncer-
tainty assessment may be itself problematic, as discussed in [46] for the case of belief
functions, and gives operationally rise to a large number of constraints.
The uncertainty invariance principle, proposed in [33], states that uncertainty
transformations should not modify the information contents of a given assignment.
To apply this principle, a measure of information has to be deﬁned for the uncer-
tainty measures involved in the transformation process.
Turning to selection criteria, the quantitative similarity criterion and the speciﬁ-
city preservation criterion can be considered.
The quantitative similarity criterion is an intuitive requirement, imposing the mini-
mization of some distance between UORIG and UDEST.
Speciﬁcity preservation is somewhat related to uncertainty invariance: the under-
lying idea is that in a transformation from a less precise formalism to a more precise
one, the amount of ‘‘precision’’ arbitrarily added (i.e. speciﬁc information not
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imprecision should be minimized in the opposite transformation. For instance maxi-
mum entropy is a well-known criterion to select a minimally speciﬁc precise proba-
bility [29], while maximal speciﬁcity has been required for transformations from
probabilities into possibilities [21].
Though each of the above listed criteria has an intuitively sound justiﬁcation, two
main problems are worth pointing out:
• not all criteria are currently applicable to any transformation: as already noticed
above, the notions underlying some criteria (e.g. information measure, entropy,
speciﬁcity) may be undeﬁned in some theories;
• some criteria are inherently conﬂicting, for instance the constraints imposed by
preference preservation may be very strong and tend to signiﬁcantly widen the
imprecision gap introduced in a transformation, thus contrasting with other cri-
teria such as uncertainty invariance, quantitative similarity and speciﬁcity
preservation.
The reader may also refer to [12] for a survey and analysis of various procedures
and of the relevant criteria, in the case of transformations from belief functions
into precise probabilities. In particular it is remarked that no existing transforma-
tion procedure complies with all the criteria analyzed. For this reason, no transfor-
mation procedure appears to be optimal in an absolute sense, since it can be rated
diﬀerently, depending on the relative importance one ascribes to conﬂicting criteria.
The criteria adopted for the transformation procedures we propose will be dis-
cussed in the relevant sections.4.2. Coping with theory peculiarities
Other problematic aspects which may aﬀect transformation deﬁnition and behav-
ior are related with peculiar and somewhat ‘‘incompatible’’ features of diﬀerent
theories.
For instance, basic properties of possibility theory lead to discontinuities which
are not present in other formalisms. As a simple example consider the problem of
transforming the lower and upper probability of a single event A (say a probability
interval: ½PðAÞ; P ðAÞ) into a necessity and a possibility value: ½NðAÞ;PðAÞ. As well
known, ½NðAÞ;PðAÞ is constrained to have the form ½0;P or ½N ; 1. This means that
NðAÞ;PðAÞ, viewed as an imprecise probability, is always either lower (if N ¼ 0) or
upper (if P ¼ 1) maximally imprecise. As a consequence, a sort of stretching of the
probability interval in one direction is required for the transformation. This can be
obtained by transforming P ðAÞ into a possibility value 1, if 1 PðAÞ < PðAÞ, i.e. if
P ðAÞ is closer to 1 than P ðAÞ is to 0, or transforming P ðAÞ into a necessity value
0, if 1 P ðAÞ > P ðAÞ. The case1 PðAÞ ¼ PðAÞ ð6Þ
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special case of (6) with P ðAÞ ¼ P ðAÞ), also in the transformation proposed for precise
probabilities in [21]. In fact, uniform probability is equated, in possibility theory, to
total ignorance: in absence of any preference, we get the extreme assignment
PðAÞ ¼ 1;NðAÞ ¼ 0 (and hence PðAcÞ ¼ 1;NðAcÞ ¼ 0), which should also be the
transformation of an imprecise probability assignment obeying (6), since again we
have no reason for modifying the upper rather than the lower imprecise probability.
However in these cases the probability/possibility transformation operator behaves
discontinuously. To exemplify, put P ðAÞ ¼ 0:5; P ðAÞ ¼ 0:5þ e, with a quite small
positive e (being therefore close to the total ignorance case): this gives
NðAÞ ¼ 0:5þ e; PðAÞ ¼ 1 (and hence NðAcÞ ¼ 0; PðAcÞ ¼ 0:5 e) with a large dis-
continuity of NðAÞ (and of PðAcÞ) as e ! 0þ. This shows that even in the simplest
case of a single event, uncertainty transformations between diﬀerent measures may
involve some singular behaviors and unavoidable distortions.
As another example, consider the role of the Mo¨bius inverse (or mass function): in
several theories its non-negativity is regarded as a basic property, so that mass values
can be interpreted as ‘‘degrees of evidence’’. Examples of information measures [33]
and transformation procedures [20,43] based on this property are available in the lit-
erature. However, these proposals have no counterpart in the context of imprecise
probabilities, where masses can be negative and have no clear intuitive interpretation
[6].
As a third example, it may be the case with imprecise probabilities that:
P ðAÞ < P ðBÞ ^ PðA [ CÞ > P ðB [ CÞ; A \ C ¼ B \ C ¼ ;;
while these conditions cannot hold with precise probabilities. These preference inver-
sions may aﬀect the ability of a given transformation to minimize additional impre-
cision, as discussed in [4].
4.3. Partial assessments
As stated in Section 2, we do not require that the information exchange concerns a
complete uncertainty assignment deﬁned on 2X, but rather a ‘‘partial’’ assessment on
an arbitrary set of events S  2X. This poses two main problems.
First of all, most uncertainty theories are customarily deﬁned referring to (at
least) an algebra of events. In order to enable partial exchanges it is therefore neces-
sary to characterize partial uncertainty assignments within each of the considered
theories: this issue will be dealt with in the relevant sections.
A more subtle problem is related to the implicit information possibly carried by a
partial assessment: one may wonder what does a given partial assessment on S entail
on other events, not belonging to S.
Concerning this problem, it is known that coherent lower probabilities can always
be coherently extended on any S0  S. In particular, when considering one additional
event A, the set of all coherent extensions of P to A is a closed (non-empty) interval
½PEðAÞ; PU ðAÞ, where PEðAÞ is the natural extension [47] of P to A. That is PEðAÞ is
the least committal or vaguest admissible coherent extension of P on A. It may be
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which requires solving a linear programming (LP) problem. In principle, other
coherent extensions may be interesting, especially the upper extension PU ðAÞ which
has the opposite meaning of least vague coherent extension of P . However, as shown
in [45, Section 5], computing PU ðAÞ may require solving up to jSj distinct LP prob-
lems. The natural extension has also another advantage: if we compute separately
PEðAiÞ for i ¼ 1; . . . ;m (i.e. we ﬁnd separately the natural extension of P on
Si ¼ S [ fAig), then fPEðA1Þ; . . . ; PEðAmÞg is the natural extension of P on
S [ fA1; . . . ;Amg. This is generally not true for any other coherent extension: for in-
stance, if we compute PU ðA1Þ and put P ðA1Þ ¼ PU ðA1Þ, then the upper extension
P U ðA2Þ of P from S [ fA1g to S [ fA1;A2g will be generally less than the value
PU ðA2Þ representing the upper extension of P from S to S [ fA2g.
It can then be questioned whether one should apply a transformation procedure
directly on a given partial assessment or should ﬁrst compute its natural extension
(on 2X) and then transform it.
The direct way appears more appealing at a ﬁrst glance. However, the choice be-
tween direct and indirect way is in general not straightforward.
On one hand, the direct way avoids or reduces the computations required to
determine the natural extension. On the other hand, a partial assignment contains
some implicit information which is actually ignored by the direct way, but could
aﬀect transformation results if considered. Therefore ignoring all implications of a
given partial assessment might be expected to originate an unsatisfactory transfor-
mation result. Again, it does not seem that a univocal answer to this question can
be easily given. An example will be discussed in Section 5.2. Note also that when
a partial assessment is an imprecise probability with speciﬁc properties (e.g. it is a
partial possibility) it is not guaranteed, in general, that such properties are preserved
by its natural extension.
In the following sections we deal with the problem of deﬁning a transformation
procedure from an imprecise probability into a precise probability, a possibility
and a belief function respectively. For each transformation we will:
• analyze transformation procedures previously proposed in the literature;
• consider the partial assessment case;
• deﬁne a transformation procedure which can be applied to both complete and
partial assessments.5. Transformations into precise probabilities
5.1. Previous proposals
The problem of transforming an imprecise probability into a precise probability
has not been previously considered in the literature in its full generality. Several
proposals exist however for transformations from speciﬁc subclasses of imprecise
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whether they can be generalized from the context where they were initially conceived.5.1.1. Voorbraak’s Bayesian transformation
Voorbraak’s Bayesian transformation takes as input the mass function m of a
given belief function and outputs a mass function mV which, in [46], is deﬁned to
be zero for all non-atomic events of 2X, while for every atom x 2 X it is:
mV ðxÞ ¼
P
AxmðAÞP
BXmðBÞ  jBj
ð7Þ
Such a mass assignment corresponds to a precise probability PV ðxÞ ¼ mV ðxÞ;
8x 2 X (cf. Proposition 1(e)). We note that this still holds if m is the mass function
of a generic capacity, since again mV is non-negative, as is not diﬃcult to verify using
Proposition 1(a). The transformation can be equivalently rewritten in terms of the
initial plausibility values of atoms: PV ðxÞ ¼ mV ðxÞ ¼ PlðxÞ=
P
x2XPlðxÞ.
In other words, Voorbraaks proposal is a normalization of the plausibility values
of atoms of X (more generally, when applied to a capacity C, it normalizes the values
on the atoms of its conjugate C 0). As such, it clearly respects a preference preserva-
tion criterion restricted to the plausibility values of the atoms of X. This is a relatively
weak property, in particular the transformation does not match with the consistency
criterion, as pointed out e.g. in [20]. However this transformation shows appreciable
properties in relation with Dempsters rule, as discussed in [11].
In [28] a method for approximating belief functions based on the concept of fuzzy
T-preorder is proposed. However this method is mainly focused on approximating a
belief function by means of possibility distributions, even though it could be directly
applied to transforming coherent upper probabilities. The existence and uniqueness
of a probability which approximates the belief function is guaranteed only for a spe-
ciﬁc choice of the T-norm to be used in the transformation. In this case, as shown in
[28], the probability obtained coincides with Voorbraaks, therefore the same consid-
erations can be applied.5.1.2. Pignistic probability
The pignistic probability transformation (PPT) has been considered in a variety of
papers, mainly concerning belief functions (e.g. [20,43]).
In particular, pignistic probabilities are suitable for decision making under ex-
pected utility theory in the transferable belief model (TBM). The necessity of PPT
in this context is justiﬁed by a linearity requirement (for recent results on this see
[44], where the formal analogy between the pignistic probability and the Shapley
value in game theory is also highlighted).
The PPT takes in input a mass function m and produces a probability Ppign on the
atoms of X:
P pignðxÞ ¼ mpignðxÞ ¼
X
XA3x
mðAÞ
jAj ; 8x 2 X ð8Þ
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focal events: it distributes uniformly their masses over their atoms.
Assuming now that m is the Mo¨bius inverse of a capacity C, it is easy to see (using
(1), (8) and additivity of Ppign) that
P pignðBÞ ¼ CðBÞ þ
X
A 6B
jA \ Bj
jAj mðAÞ; 8B 2 2
X ð9Þ
It is clear from (9) and Proposition 1(c) that PPT preserves the consistency criterion
when C is a belief function. Now the point is: what if C is not a belief function? It is
not even immediate that Ppign is then a probability, since negative masses appear in
(8). The question was ﬁrst addressed in [43], where Ppign was also derived from axi-
oms for combining credibility functions, i.e. capacities with some additional axioma-
tical properties. We extend this result by proving in Proposition 4 that PPT returns a
precise probability from any capacity. Preliminarily we summarize some results
stated in [9].
Proposition 3. Given a capacity C : 2X ! R, an associated set of precise probabilities
V can be defined as follows. Let R be the set of all permutations of the atoms of X, with
jXj ¼ N . Given r 2 R; r ¼ ðxi1 ; . . . ;xiN Þ, define r0 ¼ ; and, for n ¼ 1; . . . ;N ; rn ¼
xi1 [    [ xin ; P rðxinÞ ¼ CðrnÞ  Cðrn1Þ. Let V ¼ fP r : r 2 Rg. Then
(a) Every Pr is a (precise) probability and, 8x 2 X,
P rðxÞ ¼
X
XA3x
kðA;xÞmðAÞ ð10Þ
where kðA;xrðAÞÞ ¼ 1; xrðAÞ being the last element of A in permutation r, and
kðA;xÞ ¼ 0; 8x 6¼ xrðAÞ.
(b) The set V coincides with the set of the vertices of the set M of all precise prob-
abilities dominating C if and only if C is 2-monotone.Proposition 4. Let m be the mass function corresponding to a capacity C. Then Ppign as
defined in (8) is a precise probability.
Proof. Using (10), we have that Pr(x), and consequently
P
r2RP rðxÞ, are a weighted
sum of the masses of events A such that A 3 x. The weight of a generic m(A) inP
r2RP rðxÞ is equal to the cardinality of the set fr0jr0 2 R;x ¼ xr0 ðAÞg, i.e. to the
number of times kðA;xÞ ¼ 1. The cardinality of this set is actually N !jAj, since any
x 2 A has the same chance of being the last element of A in a given permutation
r. Therefore1
N !
X
r2R
P rðxÞ ¼ 1N !
X
XA3x
N !
jAjmðAÞ ¼ P pignðxÞ; 8x 2 X ð11Þ
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ities, and is therefore itself a precise probability. h
We answer now a further question concerning how PPT relates to the consistency
criterion.
Proposition 5. Let C : 2X ! R be a given capacity with mass function m, and Ppign be
defined by (8).
(a) If C is 2-monotone, P pignðAÞ P CðAÞ; 8A 2 2X.
(b) If C is not 2-monotone, Ppign may or may not dominate C. If P is a coherent lower
probability, Ppign dominates P on the atoms of X, i.e. P pignðxÞ P P ðxÞ; 8x 2 X,
but not necessarily elsewhere.Proof. To prove (a), observe that if C is 2-monotone the probabilities Pr are vertices
ofM by Proposition 3(b), and as such dominate C; then also their convex combina-
tion Ppign dominates C (see (11)).
If C is not 2-monotone, examples may be found where Ppign does not dominate C.
Consider for instance the coherent lower probability P on 2X, with X ¼
fx1;x2;x3;x4;x5g, which is the lower envelope of the three precise probabilities
P1, P2, P3, determined by orderly assigning the following values on the atoms x1, x2,
x3, x4, x5: P1-values [0.49,0.35,0.12,0.01,0.03], P2-values [0.14,0.03,0.07,
0.36,0.40], P3-values [0.36,0.05,0.29,0.14,0.16]. Then Ppign is given by the following
values on the atoms x1, x2, x3, x4, x5: ½0:31983; 0:16316; 0:1423; 0:1723; 0:2023. We
have that P ðx1 [ x4Þ ¼ 0:5 > Ppignðx1 [ x4Þ ¼ 0:49216.
To prove the second part of (b), let x 2 X. Considering a permutation r
(Proposition 3), let r be the position of x in r, i.e. xir ¼ x. Then P rðxÞ ¼ PrðxirÞ ¼
P ðxi1 [    [ xirÞ  P ðxi1 [    [ xir1Þ P P ðxirÞ ¼ P ðxÞ, using (3) in the inequality.
Since r is arbitrary, PrðxÞ P P ðxÞ; 8r. Hence also the convex combination Ppign of
the probabilities Pr is such that P pignðxÞ P P ðxÞ. h
We may conclude from Proposition 5 that PPT preserves the consistency criterion
as far as it is applied to 2-monotone capacities. It may not preserve it outside 2-
monotonicity, even though consistency may at least partially hold, as demonstrated
in (b).
To get some empirical insight of the behaviour of PPT outside 2-monotonicity, we
randomly generated a large number of coherent lower probabilities which were not
2-monotone (see [7] for details), computing also their corresponding Ppign: it has to
be reported that the percentage of non-dominating Ppign was relatively low, and
dominance violation numerically rather small. One of the examples we found is used
in the proof of Proposition 5.
The pignistic probability has also been interpreted (e.g. in [21], which focuses on
possibility measures) as center of gravity of the vertices ofM. This interpretation is
clearly supported by Proposition 3(b) and (11), from which it is also patent that its
validity is limited to 2-monotone probabilities. However the interpretation seems
debatable even in the context of 2-monotonicity. In fact, from (11), Ppign is the
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tations in Proposition 3 may well originate the same probability (examples are easily
found). This means that Ppign is actually a weighted average of the distinct Pr, and
the weight of any Pr is given by the number of distinct permutations r which give
rise to it.
A point which seems therefore diﬃcult to justify in the center of gravity interpre-
tation is the meaning of the weights in terms of the initially assigned 2-monotone
capacity.
5.1.3. Uncertainty invariant transformations
In order to apply the uncertainty invariance principle to imprecise probabilities,
the deﬁnition of the aggregate uncertainty measure (AU), namely the maximum
value of the Shannon entropy among all probability distributions dominating a given
belief function [33], could be directly extended to coherent imprecise probabilities.
Some limitations of AU are pointed out in [34]. In particular, AU does not distin-
guish among all imprecise probabilities which are consistent with the uniform pro-
bability, including the case of total ignorance.
A transformation based on the uncertainty invariance principle and using the AU
measure consists in determining the maximum entropy precise probability among
those in M. This is equivalent to adopting the consistency criterion with maximum
entropy as a selection criterion, but is intrinsically in contrast with preference pres-
ervation, tending to equate all probability values of atoms, as far as allowed by con-
sistency. In our opinion, this is a drawback of the criterion, as for transformations
devoted to uncertainty interchange. A discussion of pros and cons of maximum en-
tropy methods may be found in [47, Section 5.12], where it appears that these meth-
ods may be appropriate in certain speciﬁc decision problems.
Apart from theoretical issues, as to our knowledge no algorithm has been devised
for computing the maximum entropy probability PME consistent with an imprecise
probability assessment. In the case of 2-monotone capacities, it is shown in [29] that
PME is unique and an algorithm for computing it is provided. We checked that this
algorithm does not ensure the consistency condition outside 2-monotonicity. Con-
sider for this the lower probability assignment P in the proof of Proposition 5(b).
The algorithm proposed in [29] produces, when applied to P , a probability PJ deter-
mined by the values [0.26,0.16,0.16,0.16,0.26] on the atoms of X. However PJ is not
consistent with P , since PJ ða [ dÞ ¼ 0:42 < Pða [ dÞ ¼ 0:5.
5.2. An imprecise to precise probability transformation
As shown in the previous section, some existing transformation procedures pre-
serve their applicability or some important properties only in the context of 2-mono-
tone capacities. While 2-monotonicity arises in certain contexts, for instance when
using pari-mutuel models (at racetracks or in life insurance) [47], or, more generally,
convex functions of precise probabilities [16], it is also known that there are impor-
tant situations which cannot be adequately described by 2-monotonicity [47, Section
5.13.4]. Moreover, an empirical analysis carried out in [7] indicates that 2-monotone
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ities (‘‘most’’ imprecise probabilities are not 2-monotone).
Another point from Section 5.1 is that known transformations often make use
of the mass function m. This might suggest seeking for a transformation based on
m in our context too. However the interpretation of m for imprecise probabilities
is unclear (see [6] for a discussion). Moreover we are aware of no characterization
of imprecise probabilities in terms of m (like those in Proposition 1).
Further, we shall be interested in transforming assessments on a generic (ﬁnite) set
of events S,3 while existing proposals refer to complete assignments. In particular,
although the mass function exists also in the partial case [40], it is easy to see that
it does not preserve the properties it has in a complete assignment.
We recall that the notion of coherent precise probability is well-established, and is
deﬁned on arbitrary sets of events [15].
We shall now illustrate a transformation procedure operating on any coherent
imprecise probability deﬁned on a set of events S, i.e. the events considered interest-
ing by the agents involved in the interchange.
Deﬁning S ¼ 2Xnf;;Xg, we suppose at ﬁrst S ¼ S: the case S$S will be consid-
ered later. We require the transformation to meet the consistency principle, which, in
terms of upper and lower probabilities, imposes for the resulting precise probability
P* that
P ðAÞ 6 P ðAÞ 6 P ðAÞ; 8A 2 S ð12Þ
When jXj ¼ 2 (hence S ¼ fA;Acg), P* may be fully determined from
P ðAÞ ¼ P ðAÞþPðAÞ
2
. This seems reasonable, since P* reduces then the imprecision of
both P and P by the same amount, and there is no reason for P* to be closer to either
of P or P . A straightforward generalization for jXj > 2 of the idea of eliminating
imprecision in a symmetric way for each event in S* leads to considering
Pm ¼ PðAÞþPðAÞ2 ; 8A 2 S.
In general Pm is not a precise probability, but we may choose a probability P*
close to it in some way. Obviously there are several approximation choices; selecting
in particular the common least-squares approximation of Pm leads to the following
transformation problem (TP):
minu ¼
X
A2S
X
xi2A
P ðxiÞ  PmðAÞ
 !2
ð13Þ
with the constraints (12) and
P ðxiÞ P 0; i ¼ 1; . . . ;N ;
XN
i¼1
P ðxiÞ ¼ 1 ð14Þ3 We may always assume that ; and X do not belong to S, since their uncertainty evaluation is trivial.
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of constraints SC is a (non-empty
4) polyhedral set, TP is a convex quadratic pro-
gramming problem, for which polynomial-time solving algorithms are known (see
e.g. [8, Section 11.2]). TP has some desirable properties, which we derived using
well-known results in calculus and convex programming:
(a) Problem TP always returns a unique P*. In particular, TP detects whether Pm is
a precise probability, since in such a case it gives P  ¼ Pm.
(b) It may be useful to solve the linear system which equates to zero the gradient
vector of u. In fact, if its (unique) solution is an interior point in SC then it is
the required P*; otherwise we get to know that P* will be equal to either PðAÞ
or P ðAÞ for at least one A 2 S.
(c) If P ðAÞ ¼ 1; P ðAÞ ¼ 0; 8A 2 S (vague statement), TP returns the uniform
probability as P* (that may be seen applying (b)).
Let us now suppose that S$S, which is the partial assessment case.
Most known transformations cannot be directly applied to partial assessments,
because they are based on quantities which are typically deﬁned on the whole 2X.
They might anyway be applied indirectly, extending the coherent lower probability
to 2X. As discussed in Section 4.3, the natural extension PE appears to be the most
appropriate extension both theoretically and computationally. A transformation
requiring a complete assignment could then be applied to PE on 2
X, with the same
limitations discussed, for each case, in Section 5.1.
The transformation we are proposing may be applied directly to partial assess-
ments, as far as both lower and upper probability values are assigned for each A 2 S.
If this condition holds, it suﬃces to replace S* with S in TP; otherwise the natural
extension (of either P or P ) on S0 ¼ S [ fA : Ac 2 Sg should be computed before
replacing S* with S 0. In both cases the transformation problem still returns a unique
coherent precise probability P ðAÞ; 8A ðA 2 S or A 2 S0, respectively). Note that
P ðx1Þ; . . . ; P ðxN Þ are generally not uniquely determined in the partial assessment
case (except for the atoms included in S or in S 0).
We give now an example of the diﬃculty pointed out in Section 4.3. In particular,
we consider a case where the coherent extension to some event(s) in S* is unique and
show the consequences of ignoring this piece of information.
Example. Given X ¼ fx1;x2;x3g and S ¼ fx1;x1 [ x2g, the assignment
P ðx1Þ ¼ P ðx1 [ x2Þ ¼ a, P ðx1Þ ¼ P ðx1 [ x2Þ ¼ 1 a, (a 2 ½0; 13) on S is equivalent
to the lower probability assignment P ðx1Þ ¼ Pðx1 [ x2Þ ¼ P ðx3Þ ¼ P ðx2 [ x3Þ ¼ a
on the set SL ¼ fx1;x1 [ x2;x3;x2 [ x3g, which is easily seen to be coherent (for
instance, using the envelope theorem). Since upper and lower probabilities are given
for every event in S, we may consider ﬁnding P* in a direct way. Here4 Non-emptiness is implied by coherence, which ensures that M 6¼ ; in the lower envelope theorem.
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of a probability on 2X obtained from Pmðx1Þ ¼ Pmðx3Þ ¼ 12, Pmðx2Þ ¼ 0), hence
P  ¼ Pm.
However, using (3) to obtain P ðx1 [ x2Þ P P ðx1Þ þ Pðx2Þ and since
P ðx1 [ x2Þ ¼ P ðx1Þ ¼ a, we note that the given P has a unique coherent extension
on x2, P ðx2Þ ¼ PEðx2Þ ¼ PU ðx2Þ ¼ 0. Since P ðx2Þ is determined by the assessment
on S, we consider computing P* starting from Sþ ¼ S [ fx2g. We therefore add
P ðx2Þ ¼ 0 and, to be able to apply the transformation to the new assignment,
PEðx2Þ ¼ 1 2a to the initial assessment (note that the initial assignment does not
entail a unique P ðx2Þ). The new Pm is no longer a coherent probability (Pmðx1Þ ¼
Pmðx1 [ x2Þ ¼ 12, Pmðx2Þ ¼ 12 a, hence Pm is not additive), and we may compute P*
noting that the global minimum of u ¼ ðP ðx1Þ  12 Þ2þ ðP ðx2Þ  12þ aÞ2þðP ðx1Þ þ P ðx2Þ  12 Þ2 satisﬁes (12), (14) and therefore (by property (b) of TP)
gives the required P*, which is such that P ðx1Þ ¼ 1þa3 , P ðx2Þ ¼ 12a3 . Summing up,
we obtain:
P ðx1Þ ¼ P ðx1 [ x2Þ ¼ 1
2
; operating on S
P ðx1Þ ¼ 1þ a
3
; P ðx1 [ x2Þ ¼ 2 a
3
; operating on Sþ
To get an idea of the diﬀerence, let a = 0. P is then vague, and its most intuitive
transformation appears to be (the restriction on S of) the uniform probability Punif.
However P* is equal to Punif when working on S
+, not when using S.
Clearly, the example above is not suﬃcient to infer what implications of a given
assessment should be necessarily considered before running the transformation. For
instance, it is not even simple in general to detect a priori (i.e. without computing
upper and lower extensions) those events, if any, which allow a unique extension
of P , and this task may be not necessarily simpler than just computing PE for all
A 62 S; A 2 S.6. Transformations into possibilities
6.1. Previous proposals
As to our knowledge, the problem of transforming an imprecise probability into a
possibility has not been considered in general.
Transformations of probability intervals given on atoms into a possibility distri-
bution are considered in [13]. This is a restricted case of partial probability assign-
ment and relies in particular on the assumption that a complete partition is
initially given. Three procedures are deﬁned by suitably extending previous propo-
sals of transformations from precise probabilities into possibilities, they cannot how-
ever be applied to generic partial assignments.
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thoroughly analyzed in [20], considering both inner and outer consonant approxima-
tions. Inner approximations have been dealt with subsequently in [31,32]. An outer
consonant approximation of a belief function Bel is a necessity measure N such that
NðAÞ 6 BelðAÞ (equivalently, PðAÞ P PlðAÞ), 8A 2 2X, while reversing the inequali-
ties we obtain an inner consonant approximation.
We focus on outer approximations, as they satisfy the consistency criterion. In
[20] a heuristic algorithm is provided to derive an outer consonant approximation
obeying certain minimality requirements. The extension of the results of [20] to
the case of capacities is discussed in [3], this issue is however beyond the scope
of the present paper. In fact, the transformations considered in [20,3] are based
on the criteria of speciﬁcity preservation and quantitative similarity introduced
above, while neglecting preference preservation. It has however to be noted that
preference preservation might be considered the most important criterion for this
kind of information interchange, due to the basically ordinal nature of possibility
measures. As stated in [18]: ‘‘Possibility and necessity measures are set-functions
that can provide simple ordinal representations of graded belief. Their particular
character lies in their ordinal nature’’. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that a
software agent adopting possibility theory as its uncertainty model is mainly inter-
ested in the credibility ordering associated with other agents evaluations, and
would possibly accept relatively loose approximations of the senders numerical
evaluation. A transformation procedure from imprecise probabilities into possibil-
ities based on preference preservation for an arbitrary set of interesting events was
introduced by the authors in [5]. In [28] a somewhat similar criterion, concerning
the preservation of fuzzy T-preorders on elementary events only, was considered
for the special case of approximating complete belief functions. In this paper
we propose an improved and simpler version of the procedure in [5], showing that
it produces a possibility with minimal additional imprecision among those satisfy-
ing preference preservation. Since the procedure works indiﬀerently on partial
and complete possibilities, we ﬁrst consider the issue of characterizing partial
possibilities.
6.2. Partial possibilities
As well known (e.g. see [19]), a possibility measure P on the powerset 2X of a ﬁnite
partition X ¼ fx1; . . . ;xNg can be deﬁned by assigning a possibility distribution
pðÞ : X ! ½0; 1. Then Pð;Þ ¼ 0 and, 8A 2 2Xnf;g,
PðAÞ ¼ max
xi2A
pðxiÞ ð15Þ
We will consider only normal distributions, i.e. such that 9xj 2 X : pðxjÞ ¼ 1.
As to our knowledge, the notion of a partial possibility measure deﬁned on an
arbitrary set of events included in 2X has ﬁrst been considered in [50]. Further gen-
eralizations, concerning partial possibility measures whose codomain is a lattice
[14,35], are beyond the scope of the present paper.
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we slightly generalized this deﬁnition: in fact an arbitrary set of events5
S ¼ fA1; . . . ;Ang may or may not be deﬁned starting from an underlying partition
X, but in any case the partition XG generated by A1; . . . ;An can be obtained as the
set of all intersections A01 \    \ A0n, where each A0i is alternatively replaced by either
Ai or its complement A
c
i . Those intersections that are not empty constitute the atoms
of XG. Partition XG satisﬁes the following properties:
(i) any event Ai 2 S is a union of some atoms of the partition (those included into
Ai);
(ii) XG is the coarsest partition with the property (i).
We recall that a partition X is coarser than X 0 (or, equivalently, X 0 is more reﬁned
than X) iﬀ every atom of X is a union of atoms of X 0.
Property (i) is useful to relate partial to ordinary possibilities, as is done in the fol-
lowing deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 6. K : S ! ½0; 1 is a partial possibility (on S) iff there exists a possibility
measure P : 2X ! ½0; 1, such that 8A 2 S; KðAÞ ¼ PðAÞ, where 2X is the powerset of
a ﬁnite6 partition X satisfying property (i) above.
The next lemma ensures that the concept of partial possibility we propose is well-
deﬁned, in the sense that it does not depend on the choice of X within the class of the
ﬁnite partitions having the property (i). In particular, one may refer to XG, i.e. the
coarsest of these partitions.
Lemma 7. K : S ! ½0; 1 is a partial possibility with respect to a possibility defined on
2XG iff it is so with respect to a possibility defined on 2X, where X is a finite partition
more refined than XG.
Proof. We show that whenever K is the restriction on S of a possibility measure P
on 2X, then it is also the restriction of a possibility measure P 0 on 2XG . In fact, let K
be a partial possibility with respect to P, and let p be the underlying possibility dis-
tribution deﬁned on X ¼ fx1; . . . ;xtg. Any event of S is a union of atoms of
XG ¼ fxG1 ; . . . ;xGmg: consider one of them, let it be Ai ¼ xG1 [    [ xGk ; k < m. Then
we have
PðAiÞ ¼ max
xh2Ai
pðxhÞ ¼ max max
xh2xG1
pðxhÞ; . . . ; max
xh2xGk
pðxhÞ
 !
:
Now put p0ðxGi Þ ¼ maxxh2xGi pðxhÞ to assign possibility values to the atoms
xG1 ; . . . ;x
G
k of XG. By considering all the events in S, this assignment can be easily5 Again we assume that ; and X do not belong to S.
6 The ﬁniteness assumption can be easily dropped, also in the following Lemma 7. However, only ﬁnite
partitions are of interest in this paper.
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applying (15), a possibility measure P 0 on 2XG . Clearly, by construction we have
KðAiÞ ¼ P0ðAiÞ; 8Ai 2 S, i.e. K is a partial possibility with respect to XG.
Conversely, if K is a partial possibility, the reference partition is XG, p 0 is the
corresponding possibility distribution, and X is any partition more reﬁned than XG,
to see that K is a partial possibility also referring to X it is sufﬁcient to obtain K
from an appropriate possibility distribution p : X ! ½0; 1 using (15). This can be
done in more ways; a simple choice is to put, for every xGi 2 XG; pðxjÞ ¼
p0ðxGi Þ; 8xj 2 X : xj 2 xGi . h
It is shown in [50] that P-consistency is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a
partial assessment K to be a partial possibility:
Deﬁnition 8. K : S ! ½0; 1 is P-consistent iff for any A 2 S, and for any family
ðAkÞk2K of elements of S:A  [
k2K
Ak ) KðAÞ 6 sup
k2K
KðAkÞ ð16Þ
In [5] we provided a characterization of partial possibilities giving a simpler
answer to the problem of establishing whether a given uncertainty assessment K
on S is a partial possibility. In fact, while Deﬁnition 8 refers to all families of
elements of S, the equivalent conditions in the following Proposition 9 involve some
speciﬁc families only, after ordering the values of K.
Suppose, for ease of notation, that 0 6 KðA1Þ 6    6 KðAnÞ 6 1.
Further let v1 <    < vm;m P 1, be the distinct values assumed by K(Æ), and de-
ﬁne for j ¼ 1; . . . ;m:V j ¼ [ðAi : KðAiÞ ¼ vjÞ ð17Þ
V j ¼ [
j
k¼1
V k ; V 0 ¼ ; ð18Þ
SV j ¼ fAi : KðAiÞ ¼ vjg ð19ÞProposition 9. An uncertainty assessment K : S ! ½0; 1 is a partial possibility iff both
of the following conditions hold:KðAnÞ ¼ 1 _ V m 6¼ X ð20Þ
8j; 8Ai 2 SV j ; 9xGk 2 XG : xGk 2 Ai \ V cj1 ð21ÞProof. Suppose ﬁrst that both (20) and (21) hold. A possibility distribution function
p(Æ) can be assigned on XG as follows:
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put pðxGk Þ ¼ KðAiÞ;
(2) if KðAnÞ < 1, by (20) it is V m ¼ A1 [    [ An 6¼ X, and we have
xG0 ¼ Ac1 \    \ Acn 6¼ ;; xG0 2 XG. We put then pðxG0 Þ ¼ 1;
(3) assign pðÞ ¼ 0 to all the remaining atoms of XG to complete the deﬁnition of
the possibility distribution p on XG.
Then the possibility measure P obtained from p applying (15) is such that
PðAiÞ ¼ KðAiÞ; 8Ai 2 S.
Conversely, suppose now that either (20) or (21) do not hold.
If (20) is false, it is KðAnÞ < 1 ^ V m ¼ X. Hence every atom of XG is included into
(at least) one Ai 2 S, and whatever possibility distribution p is assigned on XG, this
holds in particular for every xGj satisfying the normality condition pðxGj Þ ¼ 1.
Therefore, by (15) at least one Ai 2 S should be given PðAiÞ ¼ 1 thus yielding
PðAiÞ 6¼ KðAiÞ.
If (21) does not hold, this means that 9Ai 2 SV j ; j > 1 such that Ai \ V cj1 ¼ ;,
i.e. Ai  V j1. Then K is not a partial possibility being not P-consistent: (16) does not
hold with A ¼ Ai and (Ak) formed by those and only those Ak 2 S such that
KðAkÞ 6 vj1. h
Note that condition (21), involving atoms of the generated partition, can be
checked exploiting only information about implication and incompatibility among
events, by considering its negation (as in the proof above), namely:
9j; 9Ai : KðAiÞ ¼ vj; Ai  V j1 ð22Þ
Using (22) we may conclude that (21) may be operationally checked by verifying
whether the set NOTSAT is empty or not, where
NOTSAT ðKÞ ¼ fAijKðAiÞ ¼ vj; Ai  V j1g ð23Þ6.3. A transformation procedure based on preference preservation
Given a coherent upper probability7 P on an arbitrary set S ¼ fA1; . . . ;Ang, we
deﬁne a procedure producing a partial possibility P such that:8Ai 2 S; PðAiÞ P P ðAiÞ ð24Þ
8Ai; Aj 2 S; P ðAiÞ ¼ PðAjÞ ) PðAiÞ ¼ PðAjÞ ð25Þ
P ðAiÞ > PðAjÞ ) PðAiÞ P PðAjÞ ð26Þ7 Actually the procedure is applicable to any capacity, since its properties only depend on monotonicity
of P .
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impose a weak form of the preference preservation principle. The procedure we pro-
pose is based on Proposition 9, namely on conditions (20) and (21). All the implica-
tion and incompatibility relations among the events of S are assumed to be known,
as well as whether [Ai2SAi ¼ X.
Checking whether condition (20) is satisﬁed is straightforward. If not, it can easily
be accommodated, by putting PðAiÞ ¼ 1; 8Ai : PðAiÞ ¼ vm; this also complies with
(25). The modiﬁed assignment has to be processed further if condition (21) is not sat-
isﬁed. As to this point, the transformation algorithm should modify P to make the
set NOTSAT deﬁned in (23) empty.
Suppose ﬁrst that NOTSAT includes just one event Ai. In this case, the value as-
signed to at least one event B included in V j1 should be raised to vj so that
Ai 6 V j1nB, and, to ensure preference preservation, one should also raise to vj the
values of all events C such that PðBÞ 6 PðCÞ < vj. Of course, to minimize the addi-
tional imprecision, the initial value of P ðBÞ should be as high as possible.
If NOTSAT includes more than one event, the matter is more complicated. Sev-
eral modiﬁcations of this kind should be enforced, but it is not immediate to devise
which is the ‘‘right’’ set of modiﬁcations, as they cannot be considered indepen-
dently: each modiﬁcation may aﬀect several of the sets Vi and, in a sense, the mod-
iﬁcations interact with one another.
To start reasoning, let us note that if a given Vi includes an event A 2 SV j , with
j > i, then all (due to preference preservation) events included in SV i should at least
be raised to the value vj. Then, in turn, if Vj includes an event B 2 SV k with k > j, all
events in SV j , along with all those previously raised to the value vj, should be raised
to vk, and so on.
As a simple example, consider P ðx1 [ x2Þ ¼ a > P ðx3 [ x4Þ ¼ b > Pðx1Þ ¼
P ðx2Þ ¼ c > P ðx3Þ ¼ P ðx4Þ ¼ d. Starting with the lowest values, the one assigned
to both x3 and x4 should be raised from d to b to satisfy the basic properties of pos-
sibility measures. Also the value assigned to both x1 and x2 should be raised from c
to b due to preference preservation. However, the value assigned to both x1 and x2
should be deﬁnitely raised to a and, due to preference preservation, this entails that
also the value of all other events considered in the example should in turn be raised
to a.
When proceeding sequentially, starting from the events in NOTSAT with lowest
values for P , the chain of interacting modiﬁcations involves sets Vj with progressively
higher indexes j. The chain stops when a Vstop is ﬁrst met such that 9=AjA 
V stop ^ A 2 SV q; q > stop. Such a Vstop acts as a milestone for the set of related mod-
iﬁcations: other modiﬁcations might possibly be necessary, but if so, they will involve
only events with higher P value than those in Vstop.
This idea gives rise to the following algorithm.
Step 1.
8Ai 2 S put: PðEÞ :¼ PðEÞ;
Step 2.
if ([ðAi : Ai 2 SÞ ¼ X ^maxAi2SPðAiÞ 6¼ 1)
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Step 3.
put: index: = 0;
BEGIN MAIN LOOP
Step 4.
put: v1 <    < vm the distinct values assumed by P on S
put: V j :¼ [ðAi : PðAiÞ ¼ vjÞ; V j :¼ [16k6jV k
for j ¼ 1; . . . ;m, put: TOLIFT :¼ fj > indexj9Ai 2 S;Ai  V j;PðAiÞ > vjg
if TOLIFT ¼ ; then EXIT
else
Step 5.
put: start :¼ minðTOLIFT Þ; stop :¼ minfjjj > start ^ j 62 TOLIFTg
Step 6.
8Aijvstart 6 PðAiÞ < vstop, put: PðAiÞ :¼ vstop
Step 7.
put: index: = stop; goto Step 4
END MAIN LOOP
Step 1 initializes the values of P, Step 2 checks condition (20) and enforces it if
needed, Step 3 initializes the variable index used in the main loop. Step 4 updates
a set of variables on the basis of the current values of P and index. In particular,
if the set TOLIFT is not empty, the current P is not a partial possibility. In fact, each
index i included in TOLIFT corresponds to a set Vi for which condition (22) holds. If
TOLIFT is empty, the procedure terminates, otherwise the following steps are
executed.
Step 5 assigns two variables: the start index selects, among the sets Vi identiﬁed by
TOLIFT, the one corresponding to the smallest value of the current P, while the stop
index identiﬁes the minimal (with respect to set inclusion) of the sets Vj, termed Vstop,
for which condition (22) does not hold.
The stop index is always well deﬁned: at least m 62 TOLIFT , given that
9=A 2 SjPðAÞ > vm.
Step 6 increases to vstop the possibility of events whose previous P values are be-
tween vstart and vstop. This corresponds to a set of related modiﬁcations as explained
above. Since the possibility values up to vstop will not need to be modiﬁed further, in
Step 7 the variable index is increased to stop so that only higher values are
considered in subsequent steps. Then the procedure goes back to the beginning of
the main loop.
Proposition 10. The above described algorithm is such that:
(a) it terminates;
(b) it returns a partial possibility P;
(c) let P 0 be any partial possibility consistent with P and respecting preference pres-
ervation (i.e. conditions (24)–(26) hold, where P is replaced by P 0). Then
PðAÞ 6 P0ðAÞ; 8A 2 S.
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Letting vh ¼ maxAV i;PðAÞ>viPðAÞ, B such that PðBÞ ¼ vh, it holds that
8jji 6 j < h; j 2 TOLIFT . In fact, PðBÞ > vj and B  V i  V j. Then stop P h. This
implies that any i such that start 6 i < stop at iteration (k) does no longer belong
to TOLIFT at iteration (k + 1). On the other hand, there is no index in TOLIFT
at iteration (k + 1) which was not already in TOLIFT at iteration (k). In other words,
at least the index start is subtracted from TOLIFT at each iteration, while no index is
ever added: therefore the cardinality of TOLIFT decreases at each iteration and
algorithm termination is guaranteed.
To prove (b), it is suﬃcient to verify that TOLIFT ¼ ; () NOTSAT ¼ ;. In fact,
TOLIFT ¼ ;means that if PðAÞ ¼ vj > vi then A 6 V i; 8i < j. In particular A 6 V j1
and therefore NOTSAT ¼ ;. On the other hand NOTSAT ¼ ;means that if PðAÞ ¼ vj,
then A 6 V j1. Since V i  V j1 for any i < j, then A 6 V i, for any i < j. Therefore
TOLIFT ¼ ;.
To prove (c), note that condition PðAÞ 6 P0ðAÞ obviously needs to be veriﬁed
only for the events A such that PðAÞ > P ðAÞ, namely such that vstart 6 PðAÞ < vstop in
one of the iterations (hence, by Step 6 of the algorithm, PðAÞ ¼ vstopÞ. Since
stop 62 TOLIFT , it holds that vkstop < vkþ1start where vk denotes the value assumed by v at
iteration (k) of the algorithm. Therefore, the sets of events involved by each iteration
are disjoint and it is sufﬁcient to show that the desired condition holds considering a
generic iteration of the algorithm (but for the last one, where TOLIFT is already
empty).
To this purpose, let Astart be an event such that P ðAstartÞ ¼ vstart, namely an event
with minimum initial value among those involved at iteration (k). It is then sufﬁcient
to show that P0ðAstartÞ P vstop, since preference preservation entails then
P0ðAÞ P vstop for all other events A involved by the iteration.
Let us note ﬁrst that 9B0 which belongs to NOTSAT at the iteration (k) we are
considering and B0  [P ðCÞ6vstartC ^ P ðB0Þ > vstart. When replacing K with the partial
possibility P 0 in (23), it must be NOTSAT ðP0Þ ¼ ; and, in particular, B0 62 NOTSAT .
Therefore there exists D0 2 S such that
P ðD0Þ 6 vstart; P0ðD0Þ P P0ðB0Þ P PðB0Þ ð27Þ
Preference preservation and (27) imply
P0ðAstartÞ P P0ðD0Þ P PðB0Þ ð28Þ
In the case PðB0Þ ¼ vstop, this is already the desired result. Otherwise, assuming
P ðB0Þ ¼ vh < vstop, we have that h 2 TOLIFT . Therefore 9B1 which belongs to NOT-
SAT at iteration (k), B1  [PðCÞ6PðB0ÞC ^ PðB1Þ > PðB0Þ. Reasoning as above, there
exists D1 2 S such that P ðD1Þ 6 P ðB0Þ;P0ðD1Þ P P0ðB1Þ P P ðB1Þ. These inequalities,
preference preservation, (27) and (28) imply P0ðAstartÞ P P0ðD0Þ P P0ðB0Þ P
P0ðD1Þ P P0ðB1Þ P P ðB1Þ. Again, either P ðB1Þ ¼ vstop or the argument can be iter-
ated until a PðBqÞ ¼ vstop is reached, yielding P0ðAstartÞ P P0ðB0Þ P P0ðB1Þ P    P
P0ðBqÞ P P ðBqÞ ¼ vstop. h
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sense of as precise as possible) partial possibility among those complying with the
consistency and preference preservation principles (24)–(26). It can also be shown
(we omit the lengthy proof) that the algorithm is equivalent to the one we introduced
in [5], which is less immediate and generally requires a higher number of loops to
terminate.7. Transformations into belief functions
The problem of transforming a lower probability assessment P on 2X into a belief
function Bel was considered in [4], applying the consistency and quantitative similar-
ity criteria. The consistency criterion is used regarding belief functions as less precise
than imprecise probabilities. That can be justiﬁed by the following inferential argu-
ment, showing that belief functions may produce less precise inferences: if P is an
unconditional lower probability and P ðBÞ > 0, it is known [47] that its vaguest (or
least-committal) extension on AjB is such that P ðAjBÞ P PðA \ BÞ=ðP ðA \ BÞþ
P ðA \ BcÞÞ, with equality holding if P is a belief function (actually, it suﬃces that
P is 2-monotone).
The imprecise probability/belief function transformation problem has been dis-
cussed also in [27], requiring the same consistency and quantitative similarity criteria
as above. In particular, quantitative similarity is applied by minimizing the same
objective function as in [4]. A computationally simpler heuristic algorithm, Iterative
Rescaling Algorithm or IRM, is further discussed; however, as shown in [27], IRM
guarantees consistency but does not minimize the objective function, in general.
In this section we consider the case of partial belief functions, which is not encom-
passed in the above mentioned papers. A partial belief on S  2X (if no partition X
underlying S is given, the generated partition XG can be considered) is an uncertainty
assessment which is the restriction on S of some belief function deﬁned on 2X.
Partially speciﬁed belief functions have been considered in [36,39]. The work in
[36] regards the special case of a partial assignment on the atoms of a partition
and identiﬁes necessary and suﬃcient conditions such that the assignment can be ex-
tended to a complete belief function. In [39] the more general problem of extending a
partial assignment on an arbitrary set of events S to a belief function with minimum
speciﬁcity is considered. A linear programming formulation of this problem is pro-
vided: it is remarked that a solution does not always exist and may not be unique,
when it does. Simpliﬁed methods are then provided for some special cases, especially
when the focal sets of the complete belief functions are a subset of S. Therefore,
apart from special situations, even verifying whether a partial assignment can be
extended to a belief function involves linear programming.
We turn now to the problem of transforming a coherent lower probability on S
into a partial belief function. This is achieved by the following linear programming
problem, that enforces quantitative similarity by minimizing function u, which is lin-
ear in the variables mBðAÞ; A 2 2X. The problem constraints are due to consistency
and to the properties of the mass function mB of Bel (cf. also (1) and Proposition
P. Baroni, P. Vicig / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 40 (2005) 147–180 1731(c)). The transformation of an assignment on the whole 2X is recovered from this
problem putting S ¼ 2X n f;;Xg and corresponds to that considered in [4].
minu ¼
X
E2S
P ðEÞ 
X
AE
mBðAÞ
 !
ð29Þ
subject to:X
AE
mBðAÞ 6 P ðEÞ; 8E 2 S; mBðAÞ P 0; 8A 2 2X;
X
A22X
mðAÞ ¼ 1 ð30Þ
The feasible region of this problem is always non-empty (mBðEÞ ¼ 0;
8E 6¼ X;mBðXÞ ¼ 1 is a feasible point), but the solution is not necessarily unique (in-
deed, if there is more than one solution there are inﬁnitely many, since the feasible
region is convex). However, we note that since any solution minimizes u, by (29)
it also maximizes
P
E2S
P
AEmBðAÞ ¼
P
E2SBelðEÞ. Therefore no one of the solutions
for problem (29), (30) dominates or is dominated by any other solution on the events
in S: there is no reason for preferring one solution rather than another one on dom-
inance grounds. As a possible additional selection criterion, minimum speciﬁcity [39]
could be adopted; this requires however solving an additional linear programming
problem.
As well known, given a reference partition with cardinality N, problems with be-
lief functions may involve a considerably higher number of variables than problems
with precise probabilities or possibilities, which are both determined by at most N
distinct values. An approach aiming to reduce the number of variables in (29),
(30) might be to search for a belief function Bel* such that mBðAÞ ¼ 0 whenever
jAj > k ð1 < k < N ¼ jXjÞ and A 6¼ X. This approach is closely related to idea of
k-additive belief function [25]: Bel* may not be k-additive only because mBðXÞ is
not necessarily 0; we call Bel* quasi k-additive. It simpliﬁes the problem (29), (30)
while keeping its feasible region non-empty (since it contains at least the solution
mBðEÞ ¼ 0; 8E 6¼ X; mBðXÞ ¼ 1Þ.
Note also that the solution of (29), (30) in terms of either mB(Æ) or mBðÞ automati-
cally generates a belief function on the whole 2X and it is left to the ﬁnal user (the
receiving agent) whether to use only its restriction on S or not.8. An example
Some gamblers consider betting on S ¼ fE1; . . . ;E10g, where the events in S con-
cern a certain future football World Cup and are now described. We call titled (unti-
tled) a team which already (never) won the Cup in the past.
• E1: the winner is a titled European team;
• E2: the winner is an untitled European team;
• E3: the winner is an untitled South American team;
• E4: the winner is a titled team;
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• E6: the winner is a European team;
• E7: the winner is either a titled South American team or a European team;
• E8: the winner is an African team;
• E9: the winner is a team from an Arab-speaking country;
• E10: the winner is a team from Africa or from an Arab-speaking country, and
took part in some past edition of the Cup.
The partition generated by these events is formed by the atoms e1; . . . ; e11 shown
in Fig. 1. Note that E1 ¼ e1; E2 ¼ e2; E3 ¼ e3; E4 ¼ e1 [ e4; E5 ¼ e2 [ e4; E6 ¼ e1[
e2; E7 ¼ e1 [ e2 [ e4; E8 ¼ e5 [ e6 [ e7 [ e8; E9 ¼ e7 [ e8 [ e9 [ e10; E10 ¼ e6 [ e7 [ e9,
and that e11 ¼ Ec1 \ Ec2 \    \ Ec10.
An inﬂuential agency publishes on its web site the assignment of upper and lower
coherent probabilities on S shown in Table 1.
Some of the gamblers adopt precise probabilities, possibilities or belief functions
as their own uncertainty representations. To make use of the agency evaluations they
need transforming them into their representations.
We do that, exemplifying the procedures proposed in the previous sections. Linear
and quadratic programming computations were carried out using Matlab on a stan-
dard PC.
As for transforming the given assessment into a precise probability, problem TP
(13), (14) gives the following result: P ðe1Þ ¼ 0:2115; P ðe2Þ ¼ 0:094; P ðe3Þ ¼
0:075; P ðe4Þ ¼ 0:228; P ðe5Þ ¼ 0:035; P ðe6Þ ¼ 0; P ðe7Þ ¼ 0:19; P ðe8Þ ¼ 0:005;
P ðe9Þ ¼ 0; P ðe10Þ ¼ 0; P ðe11Þ ¼ 0:1615.
Referring to the events in S, the values of P* are shown in Table 2.
A straightforward computation shows that P  6¼ Pm on S and that, in this case,
the diﬀerence is relatively small ðmaxA2S jPmðAÞ  P ðAÞj ¼ 0:002Þ.
Considering now the transformation into possibilities, let us ﬁrst apply the algo-
rithm proposed in Section 6 to the values of P given above for S. First note that the
union of the events in S is not equal to X, therefore Step 2 does not modify the
assessment. There are eight distinct values ðv1 ¼ 0:1; v2 ¼ 0:11; v3 ¼ 0:24; v4 ¼Ω
e11
e1= E1 e4
e5
e6 e7
e8
e9
e10
e2= E2 e3= E3
E8 E9
E10
E4
E6
E5
E7
Fig. 1. Events and generated partition in the football example.
Table 1
A coherent imprecise probability assessment on S
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10
P 0.18 0.08 0.05 0.43 0.28 0.29 0.52 0.18 0.15 0.06
P 0.24 0.11 0.1 0.45 0.36 0.32 0.55 0.28 0.24 0.32
Table 2
Transformation result in the case of precise probability
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10
P* 0.2115 0.094 0.075 0.4395 0.322 0.3055 0.5335 0.23 0.195 0.19
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sponding V j are:
V 1 ¼ E3; V 2 ¼ E2; V 3 ¼ E1 [ E9; V 4 ¼ E8;
V 5 ¼ E6 [ E10; V 6 ¼ E5; V 7 ¼ E4; V 8 ¼ E7
The corresponding Vj are obtained by incremental union of V

j .
Then TOLIFT ¼ f3; 4; 6; 7g. In fact event E6, having evaluation v5, is included in
both V3 and V4, while event E7, with value v8, is included in both V6 and V7. Accord-
ingly, start ¼ 3; stop ¼ 5 at Step 5, and the values of E1, E9, and E8 are raised to
v5 ¼ 0:32. In the second main loop iteration, TOLIFT ¼ f6; 7g; start ¼ 6; stop ¼ 8
and the values of E5 and E4 are raised to v8 ¼ 0:55. In the subsequent iteration
TOLIFT ¼ ; and the procedure terminates.
The resulting partial possibility is reported in Table 3.
As a remark, note that the same partial possibility would be obtained, for in-
stance, for any initial evaluation such that P ðE5Þ 2 0:32; 0:45, while in the case
P ðE5Þ ¼ 0:32 we would obtain TOLIFT ¼ f3; 4; 5; 6; 7g in the ﬁrst iteration, and con-
sequently all events but for E2 and E3 would get the value v8 ¼ 0:55. This is a further
instance of the discontinuity of this transformation already pointed out in Section
4.2.
To fully exploit the information carried by the initial assessment, one should also
take account of the lower probability assessments, which correspond (cf. (2)) to
upper probabilities on the complementary events. This means that the transforma-
tion should be applied to the events in S0 ¼ S [ fAjAc 2 Sg. Doing so the restriction
on S of the resulting possibility is less precise than the previously obtained possibil-
ity. In fact, the union of events in S 0 is now equal to X, therefore the value of one ofTable 3
Transformation result in the case of possibility
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10
P 0.32 0.11 0.1 0.55 0.55 0.32 0.55 0.32 0.32 0.32
Table 4
Transformation results in the case of belief function
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10
Bel 0.18 0.08 0.05 0.4104 0.28 0.2896 0.52 0.18 0.15 0.06
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sibility value 1 in the main loop, while the other events in S get the same value as
above.
Turning to the transformation into belief functions, solving problem (29), (30)
using the lower probability assessments on the events of S gives the results shown
in Table 4.
The initial assessment is not a partial belief function: the transformed assessment
modiﬁes the values of events E4 and E6. The overall diﬀerence between the initial and
ﬁnal evaluations is relatively small: the value of the objective function u is 0.02. The
size of this problem (2047 variables) still allowed to obtain a solution in a reasonable
time (about 2 seconds) on a Pentium III (733 MHz) PC, mainly due to the small
number of events in S. Signiﬁcantly increasing the cardinality of S and/or of the gen-
erated partition would make the problem intractable. As mentioned in Section 7, a
possible approach to limit the complexity of the problem consists in computing qua-
si-k-additive belief functions. In this example, using these functions with k P 2 kept
on returning a value of the objective function of 0.02 and only slightly modiﬁed the
values of the events E4 and E6. For instance, with k ¼ 2 we get: BelðE4Þ ¼
0:4218; BelðE6Þ ¼ 0:2782; with k ¼ 3; BelðE4Þ ¼ 0:4160; BelðE6Þ ¼ 0:2840.
Also in this case, one may consider exploiting the whole initial assessment by tak-
ing account of the upper probabilities and solving the problem on S 0, whose cardi-
nality is twice as much as the one of S. Computation times are still of the order of a
few seconds and the restriction on S of the resulting belief function is very close to
the one presented above: again u ¼ 0:02 and only the evaluations of E4 (0.4240) and
of E6 (0.2760) are modiﬁed. Very similar results hold with quasi-k-belief functions.
Clearly, this and other conclusions should not be regarded as general achieve-
ments, since this example was primarily devised as an illustration of the proposed
transformation procedures.9. Discussion and conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the issue of deﬁning an interchange format for
communication of information aﬀected by uncertainty among heterogeneous soft-
ware agents.
While interoperability among heterogeneous software agents is largely recognized
as a key issue for the development of multi-agent systems, the problem of informa-
tion interchange under uncertainty has received a relatively limited attention in the
literature, most proposals being restricted to the case of communication of ‘‘certain’’
information. The only other approach to this problem we are aware of is presented
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ods among diﬀerent uncertainty representation approaches is considered. These
works deal with the uncertainty models used in the EMYCIN, PROSPECTOR
and MYCIN systems and do not consider more general theories. Moreover they
do not introduce the notion of a common interchange format and therefore consider
direct inter-formalism transformations, which is disadvantageous in some respects
and in particular is not appropriate for indirect communication. Our work, while
sharing the same basic motivations, extends the results of [52,53,37] by devising a
suitable interchange format and by considering transformations involving more
general formalisms for uncertainty representation.
We identiﬁed coherent imprecise probabilities as a suitable candidate for an
uncertainty interchange format since they include as special cases several well-known
formalisms, in particular precise probabilities, possibilities, belief functions, whose
importance is largely recognized. Moreover, imprecise probabilities are deﬁned on
arbitrary set of events, a feature which turns out to be advantageous in the applica-
tion context we consider.
We then investigated the problem of devising new transformation procedures
from imprecise probabilities into the three formalisms mentioned above, as evi-
denced in the relevant sections, where comparisons with respect to the existing lit-
erature have also been carried out. In general, it turns out that existing
procedures cover special cases of the transformations considered, but cannot be
appropriately applied to the general case, nor do they handle the partial assess-
ment case.
Further analyses of the proposed procedures, either at the theoretical or experi-
mental level, are reserved for future work. In particular, it would be useful to char-
acterize the information distortion introduced by the procedures, to carry out a
deeper investigation about the trade-oﬀs between the use of partial assignments or
of their completion through natural extension, and to investigate the relationships
between transformation procedures and inferential methods.
While the formalism we adopted appears to be suﬃciently general to accommo-
date most application needs, we recall that, according to [49], other more general
models, in particular partial preference orderings and sets of desirable gambles,
should be considered in order to establish a uniﬁed theory of imprecise probability.
Achievements in this area might provide suggestions for the deﬁnition of a more gen-
eral interchange format and pose new problems as far as the issue of transformations
is concerned.
A further direction of generalization concerns formalisms involving a higher order
of imprecision with respect to the ones we consider. As mentioned in Section 3, a sig-
niﬁcant example, in the context of belief functions theory, is provided by the notion
of imprecise belief structures [17]. In particular, the issue of computing a belief func-
tion with suitable properties from an imprecise belief structure is addressed in [17]:
this kind of transformation involves, in a sense, a reduction of the order of impreci-
sion within the same theory rather than a transformation between diﬀerent formal-
isms. Therefore it concerns a distinct (and in a sense complementary) problem with
respect to the one addressed in the present paper.
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sider, transformations based on the principle of uncertainty invariance [33], which
however require the deﬁnition of a measure of uncertainty for imprecise probabili-
ties: recent investigations in this area include [51,33,1,2,38].References
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